Examining the Strategic Aims Behind Ethiopia's Political Fragmentation

# The Project to Weaken Ethiopia ## Egypt, Political Islam, Regional Proxies and the Attempt to Break Ethiopia's Strategic Role in Africa **By Megersa Boshe** **Rajame Intelligence** ### Executive Assessment The announcement of the so-called **Ethiopian Peoples' Forces Alliance for Survival** should not be accepted at face value as simply a spontaneous coalition of Ethiopian peoples seeking political change. In my assessment, the coalition is the visible Ethiopian layer of a much larger regional project. **The principal strategic centre of this project is Egypt, working through a wider network of political-Islamic and regional forces, including actors in Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Eritrea, with Ethiopian armed organizations being assembled as instruments inside Ethiopia.** The objective, in my assessment, is not merely to remove one Ethiopian government. The larger objective is to **weaken Ethiopia as a state, divide its peoples, reduce its military and political influence, limit its ability to project power in the Horn of Africa, and ultimately diminish one of Africa's most important forces against jihadist expansion.** This is why the new coalition deserves to be examined as an intelligence and national-security issue rather than merely as another Ethiopian political development. --- # 1. The coalition is being presented as Ethiopian — but the strategic question is who benefits Seven armed organizations have now announced their alliance: * TPLF * Fano * Oromo Liberation Army * Ogaden National Liberation Front * Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front * Benishangul Peoples' Liberation Movement * Gumuz Peoples' Democratic Movement. The stated purpose is to remove the federal government and establish a transitional administration. Reuters and AP have independently confirmed the announcement. But calling this simply a **coalition of Ethiopians** does not answer the intelligence question. The question is: > **Who created the political environment in which historically hostile organizations could suddenly be brought together, who provides the external relationships that sustain them, and who benefits from Ethiopia becoming weaker?** That is the question that Rajame Intelligence is asking. --- # 2. The Egyptian strategic problem Egypt has had a fundamental strategic dispute with Ethiopia over the Nile for years. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam transformed that dispute into a question of national strategy for both countries. For Egypt, Ethiopia's emergence as a powerful upstream state represents a fundamental challenge to Cairo's traditional conception of its strategic position in the Nile basin. But the problem goes beyond water. A strong Ethiopia has the population, geography, military capacity and regional influence to become a major power in the Horn of Africa. A weak Ethiopia cannot exercise the same influence. Therefore, from the perspective of Rajame Intelligence, **Ethiopia's fragmentation is strategically useful to those who fear an increasingly powerful Ethiopia.** This does not mean that every Egyptian citizen or every Egyptian institution shares the same objective. It means that Egyptian state strategy toward Ethiopia deserves to be examined through the lens of long-term national interest rather than isolated diplomatic statements. --- # 3. The wider Islamic political network The Egyptian dimension cannot be separated from the wider political-Islamic environment surrounding the Red Sea and Horn of Africa. Saudi Arabia has enormous religious, financial and geopolitical influence across the region. Sudan is strategically positioned between Egypt, the Red Sea, Ethiopia and the Sahel. Eritrea controls an exceptionally important section of the Red Sea coastline. These relationships create an environment in which Ethiopia can be pressured from several directions simultaneously. Chatham House reported in May 2026 that the TPLF had strengthened relationships with Eritrea and Sudan's SAF and that these actors were more broadly aligned with **Saudi Arabia and Egypt**. It also reported a coordination meeting in Port Sudan involving Ethiopian opposition groups, pro-SAF Sudanese and Eritrean participants. This is highly significant. It means that the regional environment surrounding the Ethiopian opposition is not imaginary. There is a documented regional network. The intelligence question is how far this network extends, who coordinates it, and what its ultimate strategic purpose is. --- # 4. The Cairo dimension Rajame Intelligence assesses **Cairo as the principal strategic centre of the project**. The purpose, in this assessment, is not necessarily to control every Ethiopian organization directly. That would not be necessary. A sophisticated regional strategy does not require every participant to know the entire strategic objective. Different actors can be motivated by completely different grievances: **TPLF — restoration of lost political influence** **Fano — Amhara territorial and political grievances** **OLA — Oromo political objectives** **regional armed organizations — local autonomy and territorial demands** Yet the combined effect can be the same: > **A weaker Ethiopian state.** This is precisely how a sophisticated proxy environment can function. Different groups pursue their own objectives while external actors benefit from the resulting strategic outcome. --- # 5. The TPLF is a particularly important component The TPLF cannot be understood simply as another regional political organization. For nearly three decades, the TPLF was the dominant political force within the Ethiopian state through the EPRDF system. Its loss of central power after 2018 fundamentally changed its strategic position. The subsequent Tigray war transformed its relationship with the federal government into an armed confrontation. Today, the extraordinary development is that the TPLF has joined organizations that previously fought against it. That includes Fano. Reuters confirms that Fano and TPLF forces fought on opposite sides during the 2020–2022 Tigray war and now belong to the same anti-government alliance. From an intelligence perspective, this is a major indicator. When former enemies suddenly discover sufficient common interest to establish a national military-political alliance, the immediate question is: > **What changed?** The answer cannot simply be that all of them independently developed the same political objective. There is a broader strategic convergence. --- # 6. Fano does not represent all Amhara The attempt to present Fano as the political voice of the Amhara people must also be challenged. Fano is a collection of armed factions. It is not synonymous with the Amhara population. The Amhara population contains farmers, professionals, businessmen, intellectuals, civil servants, religious communities, political organizations and millions of ordinary citizens who cannot legitimately be represented by one armed organization. In my assessment, Fano's militarization risks producing exactly the opposite of what ordinary Amhara people need. It can expose Amhara communities to: * prolonged warfare; * displacement; * economic destruction; * international isolation; * radicalization; * and association with armed extremism. An armed organization claiming to defend a population can ultimately become one of the greatest dangers to that population. --- # 7. The Oromo question is fundamentally different The Oromo political question must also be separated from the armed coalition. The Oromo people constitute the largest ethnic population in Ethiopia, and Oromo political movements have a long history of demanding political equality, self-determination and institutional reform. The **Oromo Liberation Front** and the **Oromo Liberation Army** should not simply be treated as the same organization. The OLF represents a political tradition whose central questions concern Oromo political rights and the political future of Ethiopia. The OLA represents an armed insurgency. This distinction is essential. The Oromo demand for political equality is not inherently terrorism. Nor is the Oromo population responsible for the actions of an armed organization acting in its name. --- # 8. Ethiopia's historical democratic problem I do not argue that Ethiopia's federal government is perfect. I have personally opposed the government's policies and resigned from my diplomatic career in 2020 because I could not accept what was happening. My criticism of the government therefore comes from experience and conviction. But there is an enormous difference between demanding democratic reform and participating in a regional project that could destroy the Ethiopian state. Ethiopia has never developed a sustained modern tradition of competitive national democracy comparable with established democratic systems elsewhere. Yet Ethiopia possesses its own indigenous political heritage. The **Oromo Gadaa system** provides an important example of indigenous governance, political participation, accountability and peaceful transfer of authority. For me, this history demonstrates that democracy is not alien to Ethiopia. The country can build a democratic future without destroying itself. --- # 9. Ethiopia's military role against jihadist organizations This is the part of the strategic equation that is frequently ignored. Ethiopia is not only an Ethiopian political problem. It is a major security actor in the Horn of Africa. Since 2006, Ethiopian forces have repeatedly been involved in military operations against Islamist armed organizations in Somalia and the wider region. Ethiopia's military presence has therefore been an important part of the regional struggle against jihadist organizations. This leads to a straightforward strategic calculation: > **If Ethiopia is weakened sufficiently, its ability to fight jihadist organizations is weakened.** And if Ethiopia's ability to fight jihadist organizations is weakened, the security consequences will not stop at the Ethiopian border. They extend into: **Somalia → Kenya → Sudan → South Sudan → Djibouti → Red Sea → wider Africa.** That is why weakening Ethiopia is not simply an Ethiopian matter. It is an African security matter. --- # 10. The strategic objective: make Ethiopia small Rajame Intelligence therefore assesses the strategic objective as broader than regime change. The objective is: **Divide Ethiopia** ↓ **Weaken the central state** ↓ **Create competing armed regional authorities** ↓ **Prevent Ethiopia from becoming a strong regional power** ↓ **Reduce its ability to project military power** ↓ **Reduce its ability to fight jihadist organizations** ↓ **Create a larger security vacuum in the Horn of Africa** This does not require every participant to share the same ideology. They only need to produce the same strategic outcome. --- # 11. Political Islam and the fragmentation strategy The role of political Islam must be examined carefully but directly. The issue is not Islam as a religion. Millions of Ethiopian Muslims are patriotic Ethiopians who have no interest whatsoever in terrorism or the destruction of Ethiopia. The issue is **political movements that seek to use religious identity as an instrument of regional power**. Rajame Intelligence's concern is that political-Islam networks can benefit from the fragmentation of secular, multi-ethnic states when those states lose the capacity to control territory and maintain security. The strategic danger is therefore not: **Muslims versus Christians.** It is: **political movements seeking state power through religious mobilization versus a plural Ethiopian political order.** That distinction is critical. --- # 12. Why the regional actors have an interest in Ethiopia's weakness The strategic calculation can be summarized as follows: | Actor | Strategic interest identified by Rajame Intelligence | | -------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | **Egypt** | Limit Ethiopia's Nile and regional power | | **Saudi Arabia / regional Islamic networks** | Expand or protect regional influence across the Red Sea and Horn | | **Sudanese actors** | Prevent an increasingly powerful Ethiopia from dominating regional security | | **Eritrea** | Contain Ethiopian power and oppose Addis Ababa | | **TPLF** | Recover political leverage lost after 2018 | | **Fano** | Advance Amhara armed-political objectives | | **OLA** | Advance Oromo political objectives through armed struggle | | **Other regional armed groups** | Pursue territorial and regional interests | The important point is that **their motivations do not have to be identical**. Their strategic interests can nevertheless converge. --- # 13. The coalition's greatest weakness There is also an irony in the project. The organizations now calling themselves an alliance have enormous differences. TPLF and Fano fought one another. OLA has its own political objectives. Regional organizations have territorial interests that can conflict with one another. Even public reporting acknowledges that some members remain divided over territory and political questions. Reuters reports that the groups range geographically from Tigray to the Somali Region and that some remain at odds with one another. Therefore, the alliance may be much easier to create than to govern. Removing one government is one political objective. Deciding who controls Ethiopia afterward is an entirely different problem. --- # 14. The real danger to Ethiopia The greatest danger is not that every member of this coalition is secretly controlled by one foreign power. The greater danger is that **different actors can independently weaken Ethiopia while foreign powers exploit the resulting fragmentation.** That is how geopolitical competition often works. One actor supplies money. Another supplies political connections. Another supplies territory. Another supplies weapons. Another supplies propaganda. Local organizations supply fighters. Each actor pursues its own interests. But the combined effect can be the same: **Ethiopia becomes weaker.** --- # 15. My assessment I do not believe Ethiopia should respond to this challenge by pretending that its internal problems do not exist. The opposite is necessary. Ethiopia needs: * genuine democratic competition; * equal citizenship; * protection of regional rights; * accountable government; * political reconciliation; * economic opportunity; * professional security institutions; * and a political system in which no ethnic group needs to control the centre to feel safe. But Ethiopia must not confuse **reform with national disintegration**. It must not allow legitimate grievances to become instruments of foreign strategic competition. And it must not allow the language of ethnic liberation to become a mechanism through which Ethiopia loses the capacity to defend itself. --- # Conclusion The new Ethiopian armed coalition is real. The regional relationships surrounding several of its principal actors are also real. The TPLF, Eritrea and Sudan's SAF have developed relationships that independent analysts have documented, while Chatham House has described broader alignment involving Egypt and Saudi Arabia and reported a coordination meeting in Port Sudan involving Ethiopian opposition groups, Sudanese and Eritrean participants. The deeper conclusion of **Rajame Intelligence** is that these developments should be examined as part of a larger struggle over the future of Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa. My assessment is that **Egypt represents the central strategic driver of the anti-Ethiopian project**, operating within a broader regional environment involving political-Islamic and Arab power networks, Sudan, Eritrea and Ethiopian armed organizations. The objective, as I assess it, is ultimately to make Ethiopia **smaller, weaker and less capable of influencing the Horn of Africa**. And this has consequences far beyond Ethiopia. A weakened Ethiopia means a weakened regional barrier against jihadist expansion. A fragmented Ethiopia means more opportunities for armed organizations to establish territory, obtain weapons, recruit fighters and exploit ungoverned spaces. A permanently divided Ethiopia would therefore represent a strategic loss not only for Ethiopians but for the security of Africa. I do not believe this project will ultimately achieve its objective. Ethiopia has survived far greater external pressures in its history. Its peoples have repeatedly demonstrated that they can distinguish between legitimate political grievances and attempts to destroy their common country. The answer is not blind support for whichever government happens to be in Addis Ababa. The answer is **a democratic Ethiopia that is strong enough to reform itself without being destroyed by those who seek to divide it.** That is the Ethiopia I believe should emerge from this crisis. **M Boshe** **Rajame Intelligence**

GEOPOLITICS AND ISLAM